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Abstract: 
The question addressed by the paper is whether standard procedures and widely 
accepted insights of competition policy remain valid when one deals with potentially 
anti-competitive conduct in innovative industries. The question of appropriateness 
arises because competition in these industries displays features that are radically 
different from those encountered in traditional sectors of the economy. Competition is 
for the market rather than in the market, dynamic aspects of competition matter more 
than allocative aspects, intellectual property rights (IPR) reinforce network effects 
present in knowledge-based industries. The paper examines why these differences 
matter with respect to market delineation, assessment of intensity of competition and, 
predatory conduct. It also raises the question to what extent competition law limits the 
innovator’s rights not to license them to others, especially when they correspond to 
essential facilities. It explores the problem created by excessive protection as well as 
the hold-up problem that arises in a context of sequential innovations. It examines the 
antitrust position in regard to the treatment of collaborative arrangements among 
holders of IPR’s, such as cross-licenses, patent-pools and joint standard settings. 
Finally, it presents a discussion on a possible role of competition law in shaping 
intellectual property laws in order to benefit from the complementarity’s between 
intellectual protection and antitrust rules. 
 
Key words: antitrust, intellectual property right, cumulative innovation, cross-
licenses, patent-pools, joint standard setting. 
JEL classification: L40, O33, O34 
                                                 
1 The authors thank Christopher Budd, Claude Crampes, Dominique Guellec and David Ulph for their 
useful suggestions and comments to a previous version of this paper. 
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Introduction  
 
This paper examines issues that revolve around the enforcement of competition law in 
innovative industries. Firms in innovative industries are engaged in activities rich in 
technological opportunity. For that reason, they are expected to generate a sustained 
flow of new products and processes, some of which may represent major rather than 
incremental advances. Competition in innovative industries displays features not 
encountered in traditional sectors of the economy - sectors that have shaped accepted 
wisdom in regard to antitrust enforcement procedures. This raises the question 
whether these procedures are applicable to highly innovative industries. 
 
In the main, the objective of antitrust, or competition policy, is to enhance, economic 
welfare. Competition policy pursues this objective by quelling forms of conduct that 
reduce the number of market participants or their ability to compete. The aim is to 
avoid conditions where an individual agent or group of firms acting jointly become 
immune from the disciplining influence of rivalry. Competition policy posits that 
rivalry in the marketplace prompts firms to reduce waste and offer at the lowest 
possible price a range of products closely tailored to consumers’ preferences.  
 
The problem is that in highly innovative industries, the effects of competition on each 
of the aforementioned components of economic performance do not necessarily match 
those found in mature industries. This explains why the ongoing debate about the 
validity of antitrust procedures in innovative industries is so controversial2. Of major 
importance in this regard - particularly for industries with high technological 
opportunity - is the question how the intensity of competition affects the rate if 
innovation. 
 
The objective of this paper is not to provide detailed economic analysis of the 
relationship between competition and innovation or to supply a detailed assessment of 
the antitrus t jurisprudence. It is to give an overview of salient issues and to highlight 
the pitfalls of a mechanical application to high tech sectors of methods developed 
with mature industries in mind. More generally, the paper explores three different 
channels whereby competition policy in innovative industries is liable to affect 
welfare. They correspond respectively to competition in the innovation race 
(competition for the market), competition in the technology market (through diffusion 
of knowledge, licensing and other forms of technology transfer) and competition in 
the product market. The intensity of rivalry in each of these markets has an impact on 
technological progress via incentives to innovate. At the same time, innovation affects 
competition via it effects on industry structure. 
 
The paper focuses on three issues. First, it provides some theoretical analysis of how 
competition affects the pace of innovation and how innovation affects the evolution of 
market structure. Second, it examines the risks of applying an approach inspired by a 
static view of markets to a setting where structure is at all times evolving as a result of 
the introduction of new technologies. Third, it explores the relationships between 
                                                 
2 The main arguments that bear on the ongoing debate can be found in Posner (2001), Audretsch et. al. 
(2001), Eisenach and Lenard (1999), Bresnahan (1999), Katz and Shapiro (1999), Rubinfeld (1998)). 
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competition policy and intellectual property rights. In regard of the latter, it asks 
whether the two bodies of law are necessarily in conflict. It also touches upon the 
question whether the recent extension of patent protection to new areas is likely to 
increase the rate of technological innovation. Fur thermore, it  examines the position of 
antitrust authorities vis-à-vis some forms of cooperation between innovative firms.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses specific characteristics of 
competition in innovative industries. It also delves into the theoretical foundations of 
the effects of product market competition on incentives to innovate and derives 
implications for competition policy. Section 2 concentrates on the shortcomings of 
standard antitrust enforcement procedures in innovative industries. It identifies 
problems raised by a static approach of competition policy in regard to market 
delineation, the appraisal of competition and, the assessment of market power. 
Predatory pricing is used to exemplify how the standard procedures may mislead in a 
highly innovative environment. Section 3 explores potential and real conflicts 
between intellectual property law and competition law. It asks to what extent 
competition law may restrict an innovator’s right not to use his protected knowledge 
and not to license it to others. Section 4 deals with the problems raised by cumulative 
and complementary innovations. It argues that strengthening intellectual property 
rights may slow the speed of technical progress. It also examines the attitude of 
antitrust authorities with respect to cross-licensing, patent-pooling and joint standard 
setting. The concluding section reflects on a possible role for competition authorities 
in shaping intellectual property law. 
 
1. Competition in innovative industries 
 
i/ Competition in the market versus competition for the market  
 
Competition in innovative industries is best pictured as a sequence of races to develop 
new technologies. Victory in a race is often followed by the attainment of a leadership 
position in one or more product markets. This, however, does not entail that the 
winner can rest and quietly enjoy the fruits of victory. Maintaining leadership almost 
invariably requires the immediate entering of a new race. For that reason, a string of 
successive wins by the same firm, accompanied by persistent leadership in a product 
market, does not carry the implication that competition is necessarily absent. 
Technological opportunity and winner-take-all (or winner-take-most) outcomes 
suggest that the form of competition that matters most from a welfare point of view is 
not that which takes place in a product market as is the case for mature industries. It is 
competition for the product market, i.e. a race to be the first to bring a new product to 
market or to produce by means of a new technology. In contrast to mature industries 
where new participants gradually acquire market share, successful entry in innovative 
industries often results in a rapid replacement of the dominant incumbent. 
 
Because the R&D cost in these industries is substantial and largely independent of 
production volumes, average total cost declines with output. The implication is that 
firms cannot survive by setting price close to marginal production cost.  
 
Also, network effects as well as positive feedback effects are common in knowledge-
based industries. Network effects refer to the increase in value each user attributes to 
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a product when the number of other users increases, as in the case of fax machines for 
instance. There is positive feedback when goods are complementary and increased use 
of one good makes the other goods more valuable to users. For instance, a larger 
installed base of an operating system enhances the value of word processing software 
that runs on that system. Similarly, increased use of that software enhances the value 
of the operating system. Both network and positive feedback effects generate inter-
temporal increasing returns to scale. Markets were these effects are strong are subject 
to “tipping” i.e. there is a point in time when the existence of different incompatible 
products may become unstable. The consequence is dominance by a single product. 
Tipping contributes to adoption of a de facto standard.  
 
What also matters from a competition policy perspective is that the knowledge 
produced by innovators can be exploited either directly by having innovators 
themselves produce and sell goods and services that embody the newly created 
knowledge or, indirectly, via a transfer of new knowledge by licensing it to others 
who undertake production.  
 
Therefore, competition policy in innovative industries is liable to affect welfare 
through three distinct channels. First is the intensity of the race to innovate. Second is 
competition in the product market, presumably affecting variables such as price and 
service quality. The third channel is competition in the licensing market. Conduct that 
lessens competition in one area may strengthen it in another. As a result, competition 
policy inevitably confronts two intertwined but conceptually different issues: i) how 
to assess the effects on competition in each of the three aforementioned areas; ii) how 
to calibrate trade-off between possibly contrary effects of competition in different 
areas; specifically, how to assigns weights to dynamic and static aspects of 
competition.  
 
These characteristics of rivalry in innovative industries are relevant to the question 
how one judges the effectiveness of competition policy. If one takes the view that 
competition policy is more naturally oriented towards the aspects of competition in 
the product market, the effectiveness of competition policy in innovative industries 
depends on whether more intense competition in the product market increases 
dynamic efficiency. In other words, if races to bring new products to market or to 
reduce costs are critical, and if one expects winners to gain all or the lion’s share of 
the market, then competition policy must be judged on the basis of whether it 
increases the incentives to innovate.  
 
ii/  The relation between product market competition and the 
incentives to innovate: a theoretical overview 
 
In their pioneering work, Arrow (1962), Lee and Wilde (1980), Dagupta and Stiglitz 
(1980) have looked at the question how changes in the number of participants in an 
R&D race affected the rate of innovation. On the basis of their findings others have 
claimed that more intense rivalry always increases incentives to innovate. This is not 
quite true. The problem is that this claim does not explicitly distinguish between the 
number of participants in an innovation race and competition in a product market. An 
increase in the number of racers always increases R&D effort. The more relevant 
question from a public policy point of view is how competition in the product market 
affects the rate of innovation. 
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In order to properly address this question, one must use a framework that has the 
following features 1) the intensity of competition in the product market should be 
defined in terms that are both precise and sufficiently general; 2) product market 
structure at each point in time should be endogenously determined by the distribution 
of costs across firms and by the intensity of competition; 3) analysis should bear both 
on industries where firms have similar costs (leveled industries) and, industries where 
cost differ substantially across firms (unleveled industries )3.  
 
Recent results by Boone (2001) provide some interesting insights. First, intensity of 
competition is defined is general terms. An increase of competition in a leveled 
industry lowers each firm’s profit (“level effect”). An increase of competition in an 
unleveled industry reduces the profit of the least efficient firm. It increases the profit 
of the most efficient firm  provided competition is intense The latter results are 
labeled “variance effect”. Also, as the technological gap between the most efficient 
firm and the least efficient firm increases, stronger competitive pressure lowers the 
number of active firms in the market.  
 
Boone assumes that the R&D sector consists of a number of laboratories that engage 
in race, the prize of which is an infinitely lived patent on a cost-reducing technology. 
The winner sells the patent to the highest bidder among firms in the industry. Boone 
finds that the identity of the winner depends on the intensity of competition. When  
intensity is low, a less efficient firm has greater incentive to buy the innovation than a 
more efficient one. When it is high, a more efficient firm has the greater incentive to 
innovate. These results are generalizations of earlier findings by Vickers (1986) and 
Beath et al. (1995), who show that in Bertrand competition, low cost firms innovate 
while in Cournot competition, high cost firms can be the innovators.  
 
The intuition is clear: The sacrifice in profit by a technological leader who fails to 
innovate increases with the intensity of product market competition. The implication 
is that ones observation that process innovations come from a technological leader 
rather than from other firms should be interpreted as a signal of its higher efficiency 
rather than of the absence of rivalry in the product market. Similarly, a process 
innovation introduced by some inefficient firm or by a new entrant is indicative of the 
fact that strategic considerations do not matter too much in the market.  
 
The second step in Boone’s (2001) analysis involves an investigation of the link 
between the intensity of competition and the incentive to innovate where the latter is 
measured by the winner’s willingness to pay. The main result is that this relationship 
is not always monotonic. This is due to the fact that changing the intensity of 
competition changes the identity of the winner and consequently the valuation of the 
innovation. More precisely, when the cost improvement is substantial, an increase of 
the competitive pressure increases the valuation of the innovation. When the  
improvement in cost reduction is minor and competition in the product market is 
weak, increasing competition has an ambiguous effect on the willingness to pay the 
innovation. It may be positive or negative. Overall, one cannot be sure that more 
intense product market competition always leads to faster technological progress.  
 
                                                 
3 The latter is necessary because innovation affects the dynamics of industry structure. 
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Two implications for competition policy are important. First, increased dominance by 
a single firm must not be interpreted as a lack of competition. Rather, it may signal 
that the technological leader has the most incentive to innovate because competitive 
pressure is strong.. Second, competition policy could increase the speed of 
technological progress in the economy by making a distinction between innovative 
industries: 1/ In industries where innovation leads to a small cost reduction and where 
the level of competition is weak, it would be better to aim for low intensity 
competition. This would give a follower an incentive to leapfrog a technological 
leader. In such industries, turnover among the leading firms is high. 2/ In industries 
where innovation leads to a major cost reduction and where competition is intense, 
increasing the level of competitive pressure is the appropriate policy. Moreover, in 
such industries, one is likely to observe a persistent dominance by a single firm. 
Absence of leapfrogging should not be viewed as indicative of little competition.  
 
Boone’s results have been obtained in a framework involving a single race in which 
the process innovation is deterministic. Encaoua and Ulph (2000) have used a model 
that assumes successive innovations taking place at different points in time according 
to a Poisson law, with a hazard rate depending on R&D effort. There is a continuum 
of industries in the economy, with two firms in each industry. When, in some 
industry, a technological laggard is successful in innovating, two possibilities must be 
considered: When there is little diffusion of knowledge in the industry, a laggard firm 
is able to innovate only from its own technological base and, when it does, it catches 
up with the leader. This matches the “step by step” process of innovation as in Aghion 
et al. (1997, 2001). But, when there is a speedy diffusion, a laggard firm may  
innovate from the current knowledge frontier and, if successful, leapfrogs the leader. 
This is close to the “creative destruction” assumption in endogenous growth theory 
(Aghion and Howitt, 1992, Caballero and Jaffe, 1993). It appears that the effects of 
product market competition on innovation and growth depend on the value of a 
knowledge diffusion parameter. When it is sufficiently high, an increase in 
competitive pressure always increases the speed of technological progress because the 
follower has a higher incentive to innovate. This corresponds to the “escape from 
competition effect”. When the diffusion is low, the effect of competition on 
innovation and growth may become negative. An increase in competitive pressure  
lowers the R&D effort of a follower and reduces the proportion of “leveled” 
industries at equilibrium. In other words, the “level effect” outweighs the “variance 
effect” in this case.  
 
One implication of these results is that the degree of knowledge diffusion is crucial to 
obtain a positive impact of product market competition on the pace of innovation. 
This diffusion depends on the patent holders willingness to transfer their knowledge 
by licensing their patents or, by using any other contractual form of transfer. 
Increasing the diffusion by giving to the patent holders incentives to license their 
patents may thus become an important objective.  
 
2. Antitrust enforcement in innovative industries 
 
i/  Market delineation and the appraisal of competition. 
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The standard antitrust analysis involves a stepwise procedure. It starts with the 
delineation of one or several markets where competition may be affected. It then 
proceeds with the assessment of the state of competition and of the effects of the 
impugned conduct in the market. If the conduct is found to have lessened competition 
substantially or is expected to do so, there may come a third step involving a 
comparative analysis of the effects of various remedies. 
  
 1. Market delineation 
 
Market delineation is an analytical tool that helps determine whether a firm or a group 
of firms can act freely from the influence of others in areas where such action matters 
most in regard to consumer welfare.4 Market delineation typically starts with a 
product (or a collection of products) currently produced and proceeds by asking the 
following questions: i) How would the profits of the current seller(s) of the product be 
affected if its price underwent a change; ii) which products do consumers perceive to 
be substitutes to those produced by a seller at the current price and, which would they 
perceive as such if the same seller priced close to production cost. The first question is 
more likely to be raised in a merger case, the second in an abuse of dominance suit. 
 
This approach raises two difficulties in a context where competition centers on 
innovation. The first problem flows from the choice of an existing product as a 
starting point of a process that delineates a market by adding producers sequentially 
until a predetermined stopping rule applies. The second derives from the use of 
hypothetical price changes to separate the producers belonging to the market from the 
outsiders. 
 
In non-innovative industries the standard approach which considers hypothetical price 
changes makes sense because concern is with monopoly pricing in a product market5. 
When dealing with an industry where the pace of innovation is key, antitrust markets 
ought to be defined in a way that makes them useful in assessing firms’ liberty to 
choose R&D expenditure unconstrained by others. It is not obvious that this can be 
accomplished by searching for substitution possibilities among existing products. In 
innovation races, the focus has to be on future products (Audretsch et al. 2001).  
 
In this regard though, one must keep in mind that firms searching for new ways to 
satisfy a particular consumer need not at present sell close substitutes. One must also 
consider the possibility that firms currently in the same product market may devote 
their R&D effort to next-generation products that are not close substitutes.  
 
Market delineation in innovative industries must be based on the degree of overlap 
between the next-generation products perceived at present to emerge from the R&D 
efforts of different firms. In this regard one must also take into account that a single 
R&D program might profit several next-generation products that are not substitutes of 
                                                 
4 How one goes about defining the relevant market must therefore depend on the nature of the action 
that matters from a competition perspective. The recent Microsoft case is revealing in this regard. 
Although the focus centred on the pricing and tying of the browser, the litigious conduct was designed 
to protect market power in the market for operating systems. 
5 Even when such variables as quality and variety are important instruments of competition one tends 
to posit  that  they change in a way that affects consumers in the same way as the expected or observed 
price changes.  
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each other.  Clearly, decisions in regard to R&D spending depend on the expected 
returns from all applications. Such knowledge cannot be expected to rest within 
antitrust enforcers. Thorough consultation with industry must therefore be part of the 
market definition process in innovative industries. 
 
 2. Assessing market power  
 
A firm may enjoy a large market share either because it faces no competition or 
because it is more efficient than its competitors. In both cases, profitability is regarded 
as an element belonging to the bundle of indicators of market power. But, in markets 
driven by innovation, high ex-post returns on investment do not reveal anything about 
market power. Indeed, if such returns were unachievable, no one would take part in 
the race. The relevant criterion is expected return. This datum, however, is not easily 
calculable or straightforward to interpret. It is true of course that in mature industries 
as well, expected earnings rather past earnings are what matters. However, in the 
latter industries it is far more likely that the assets that made it possible to obtain these 
earnings in the past will not suddenly and thoroughly become obsolete in the near 
future. Therefore, looking backwards in order to gain an appreciation of future profits 
including profits from monopoly power is more revealing in a mature industry than in 
an innovative industry. When dealing with the latter one must also be careful to insure 
that the inferences about monopoly power drawn from profitability measures are 
adjusted for risk.  
 
Furthermore, at the industry level, profitability measures may be biased upward by 
ignoring past investment by firms that no longer exist or biased downward by 
incorporation of investment made by successful innovators who have not yet had the 
chance to bring a product to market. 
 
 3. Entry 
 
In traditional industries, monopoly power requires more than the mere absence of 
significant competitors in the market. It also requires that firms not currently in the 
market not be able to enter in within a short time at a sufficient scale. The scale of 
entry whose likelihood needs to be assessed is the scale necessary to discipline actors 
already in the market. In humdrum industries the area of concern is generally price 
and the required entry scale is therefore that which eliminates independent pricing. It 
is not a scale that normally requires that a single entrant or a collection of entrants 
gain the lion’s share of the market.  
 
In innovative industries by contrast entry into a product market can be profitable only 
if it is expected to lead, within a reasonably short time, to the acquisition of 
considerable market share in the product market. The question is therefore whether all 
the assets required to achieve such entry are available outside the firm currently 
dominant in the product market. Practically, that means that an outsider must possess 
superior technological know-how not yet exploited in the relevant product market. 
Complementary assets in production and distribution must also be available outside 
the dominant firm. However, these assets need not be controlled by the same entity as 
the knowledge assets. Licensing of knowledge and other arrangement make it possible 
to enter without being the owner of all the needed inputs. However, in view of the fact 
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that both licensing and the transfer of knowledge entail cost, entry is more likely 
when all necessary complementary inputs are owned by the same entity.  
 
Barriers to entry are high when the amount of resources a firm puts at risk by entering 
are high compared to expected profit. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind 
that the amount of money put at risk is probably less than proportional to the scale of 
entry because most of the costs that have sunk components are fixed.  
 
ii/  Conduct: Predation and other exclusionary strategies 
 
Exclusionary as well as competitive conducts frequently eliminate rivals. Competitive 
conduct produces exit when a firm can no longer keep up with the efforts of other 
firms to offer improved products or lower prices. The distinguishing feature of 
exclusionary conduct is that it takes aim deliberately at rivals or potential rivals in an 
effort to inhibit their capacity to compete. The payoff from such conduct is expected 
to flow not from increased consumer satisfaction but from reduced competition.  
 
Testing for predation requires that one establish a baseline against which initial 
sacrifices and subsequent extra profits are assessed. In a world of perfect information, 
it would be sensible to let that baseline be the level of profit under some (optimal) 
non-exclusionary conduct. In the real world, this is not practical because to infer the 
potential profits from such hypothetical conduct calls for unobtainable information 
about current and future cost and demand structures. It also puts the burden on courts 
to form opinions about the consequences of hypothetical business strategies.  
 
Feasible alternative inferences of predatory intent can be obtained through testimony 
or, from deductions grounded on simple tests. Under the Areeda and Turner (1975) 
criterion, a price at or above the reasonable anticipated average variable cost – a 
proxy for marginal cost - is conclusively be presumed lawful, whereas a price below 
such cost is conclusively presumed unlawful.6 The predatory standard in the US as 
determined by the Supreme Court in the Brooke case is that below-cost pricing is 
necessary for a finding of predation. 7  
 
While such test of predatory pricing has its shortcoming in traditional industries, it is 
basically a non-starter in highly innovative industries, particularly those where 
network effects and positive feedback are strong. In such industries competitive 
pricing looks very much like predatory pricing in traditional industries. Low initial 
prices help a firm to quickly expand its customer base thereby putting it in a position 
where it can start charging higher prices because its product has become more 
valuable. A firm exempt from any competitive threat may also find it advantageous to 
adopt such penetration pricing strategy. However, competition for the market is likely 
to strengthen the incentive to quickly attain significant size and market share, possibly 
in order to have ones standard adopted by the industry.  
 
                                                 
6 This rule was used to absolve IBM of predatory price-cutting. California Computer products Inc et al. 
v. International Business Machines, 613 F. 2d 727, 9th cir. 1979 
7 The court also held that plaintiffs have to establish that the predator had a reasonable expectation of 
recouping the initial losses through future price increases. [Brooke Group Ltd.v. Brown and 
Williamson Tobacco Corp.,U.S. 209, 113 S.Ct. 2578;125 L.Ed. 2d 168 (1993)] 
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Because winner-take-all implies loser-take-nothing, price strategies designed to avoid 
eviction do, in the main, overlap those designed to evict others. In markets that 
possess the characteristics described above, the prize is obtained by becoming 
dominant or maintaining a position of dominance in the product market. Therefore 
any battle in the product market - including a price battle - to gain or maintain that 
position must be viewed as an investment in future returns. In this regard it is not 
different from the race to innovate. It is pointless to ask whether an impugned policy 
would be profitable if it did not bring about a rival’s exit. As long as there is intense 
competition in the product market, the answer, almost surely, is that it would not.  
 
The relevant question in regard to exclusionary conduct is whether, in the race to 
acquire market share, firms make the effort to run faster than rivals or whether their 
effort is directed at slowing rivals. In this regard, it is interesting to consider the 
possibility of predatory product innovation. The latter involves the launch of a new 
product that competes with an existing product already marketed by a rival. The 
objective is to reduce rival’s sales and evict him from the market.8 What makes the 
launch predatory is a lack of expectation that the new product would generate a 
positive return. 
 
However, if competition for that new product is competition for the market, then the 
absence of positive returns can only mean that the revenue from the sale of the new 
product does not permit recovery development and production costs even if the rival 
exits. But, if so, predatory product introduction can be rational only if it helps protect 
other products sold by the predator from encroachment by the target firm. Necessary 
conditions for predation are therefore: 1) expected lifetime revenue from sales of the 
new product is less than incremental development and production cost; 2) expected 
increment in sales from all products is larger than the incremental development and 
production cost of the new product. However, failure to meet one or both of these 
tests after the facts does not imply the absence of predatory intent; it may reflect 
erroneous expectations. What matters in regard to predatory intent are the 
expectations at the time R&D cost and other set-up cost are sunk. Thereafter, the 
reversible cost is likely to be less than price even if the latter does not allow recovery 
of all costs.  
 
In regard to R&D it is important as well to consider that spillover effects may affect 
the conclusions one can draw from cost versus revenue comparisons. When the R&D 
required to launch product B has beneficial effects on the cost of producing an older 
product A or, if it improves the  attractiveness of that product to consumers, then this  
should be netted. Indeed, it is a benefit that does not flow from an increase of market 
power in product A.  
 
Fortunately, a product launch is likely to be backed up by internal documents that 
may provide direct evidence of intent that cannot be garnered from cost versus 
revenue comparisons. The case against IBM where the company was accused of 
having introduced a supercomputer as part of a predatory strategy targeted at Control 
                                                 
8 Ordover and Willig (1981, page 22) put forward that “product innovation may be more effective than 
price-cutting in inducing exit of a rival because the associated costs to the firm are largely fixed and 
irreversible. After a firm commits the requisite R&D and other fixed costs, the remaining reversible 
cost of the product introduction may be so small that the firm would not abandon its tactic whatever the 
rival’s response. Aware of this fact, rivals may quickly exit”.  
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data is a case in point 9. Much the evidence entered in court revolved around the 
question whether IBM anticipated losses from its super computer. An alternative 
theory, one supported by internal documents, was that IBM engaged in product 
market signaling. According to that theory, it made sense to purchasers of general-
purpose computers who confronted uncertainty concerning product quality to emulate 
the purchasing behaviour of the better- informed buyers of scientific computers. If so, 
introduction by IBM of a product that the well- informed would purchase allowed the 
company to perform a useful signaling function (Pittman, 1984).  
 
3. Antitrust and the protection of intellectual 
property: complementary or conflicting?  
 
How do the antitrust laws link up with the intellectual property (IP) laws? At a high 
level of abstraction, the two bodies of laws appear complementary. Both pursue a 
welfare objective. IP laws do so by creating and protecting the right  of innovators to 
exclude others from using their ideas or forms of expression. This provides economic 
agents with the incentive to engage in efforts that produce technological innovations 
and new forms of artistic expression. Patent law encourages the diffusion of 
knowledge by making the grant of a patent conditional on the disclosure of essential 
characteristics of the innovation for which a patent is sought. This facilitates access by 
other innovators to the knowledge embodied in the patent. A further incentive to 
diffusion is provided by provisions that make it possible to exploit intellectual assets 
via licensing arrangements. In both these regards, diffusion certainly appears 
consistent with competition goals.  
 
However, as one descends from lofty principles and broadly defined objectives to 
practical implementation, tensions between the two bodies of law begin to emerge. 
These relate to the following:  
 
1) Property rights. Specifically, whether a patent holders’ right not to exploit 
a patent by undertaking production or by issuing a license is absolute, or 
can be hemmed in on the basis of competition principles?; 
2) Exclusionary terms. Specifically ones right to include in licensing 
contracts restrictive clauses such as exclusivity terms, grant back 
requirements or, territorial restrictions. 
3) Cooperative arrangements. Specifically The right to work together with 
others in joint research or cooperative exploitation of intellectual property. 
 
i/  Tensions between antitrust and intellectual property protection 
 
The main question from a competition policy perspective is whether the 
aforementioned forms of conduct should receive the same treatment when they are 
based on the exploitation of IP as when they involve the mere use of physical assets. 
In this regard, the bulk of the jurisprudence, both in the US and the European Union, 
shows that antitrust courts have been more lenient towards potentially abusive 
                                                 
9 U.S. v. International Business Machines ( 69 Civ. 200, S.D.N.Y.) 
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conduct involving the use of intellectual property (OECD, 1998). This is based, in 
part at least, on a desire not to inhibit innovation. 10  
 
However, the recent extension and/or strengthening of protection in areas such as 
software, databases, business methods and research tools has heightened fears that 
intellectual property law may now inhibit innovation instead of promoting it. The 
reason is that in several industries. it has become more costly to acquire know-how 
critical for entry. Also, the proliferation of new rights and the strengthening of 
protection in traditional areas seem to contribute to a proliferation of infringement 
suits. This and the generosity of awards to plaintiffs appear to many as a disincentive 
to engage in research that builds on protected knowledge.11. Economists have spoken 
of excess of protection (Gallini and Trebilcock 1998), patent thicket (Shapiro 2001) or 
digital boomerang (David 2001) as they articulated their apprehensions that recent IP 
legislation will adversely affect the pace of innovation. 
 
Competition authorities have expressed a similar concern. The chairman of the US 
Federal Trade Commission has wondered publicly how many of the patents granted 
met minimal standards in terms of novelty, non-obviousness and utility; whether a 17-
year protection period was always warranted; how much legal action for infringement 
had merit based on fact (Pitofsky, 2000). He has also raised the question whether 
many patent applications were not filed simply to increase ones bargaining power vis-
à-vis next generation innovators. Some of these issue are addressed in greater detail 
below. 
 
ii)  Boundaries of the right to exclude  
 
IP laws do not obligate the holders of an intellectual asset to exploit it directly or to 
license others to so. The question whether such duty exists under competition law can 
be broken down as follows:  
 
i) Under what conditions, if any, can direct exploitation of IP or licensing of IP 
be enjoined on the basis of antitrust principles? Should such conditions be 
identical to those applying to physical assets under the essential facilities 
doctrine? 
ii) Does ones right not to exploit protected knowledge also imply a right not to 
supply a good produced with that knowledge under conditions where refusal to 
supply would otherwise trigger antitrust action? 
iii)  Should the application of antitrust rules in regard to discrimination among 
licensees of protected knowledge be identical to those applying to the sale of 
humdrum goods or services?  
 
                                                 
10 Notable in this regard is adoption by antitrust authorities of a test under which a restrictive provision 
in a licensing contract should be allowed if it does not lessen competition more than disallowing the 
license. 
11 The United States took at the beginning of the 1980s a number of decisions designed to reinforce 
intellectual property rights both domestically and abroad. According to Hall and Ham (1999)  “the 
1982 formation of a centralised appellate court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ushered in 
a “pro-patent” legal environment in the United States”. Scotchmer (1999) claims that “this Court has 
upheld a much larger fraction of patent holders who complain of infringements than previous courts” 
See also Lerner (1995).  
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Courts in the US and the EU have at times held that refusals to license a patent violate 
competition law. However, in neither jurisdiction, have they provided clear direction 
as to when a refusal to deal is anticompetitive where it involves intellectual property. 
The following cases illustrate the current state of affairs in the US.  
 
1. In the Kodak case the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the defendant’s 
refusal to license patented parts of its copiers to rival independent organizations 
was unlawful; The reason was anti-competitive intent. The Court held that a 
refusal to license would have been presumptively valid in the absence of evidence 
that the company’s intent was to eliminate competitors e.g. if the sole purpose was 
to earn a larger return on its R&D investment. However, another court reached a 
radically different conclusion in the later Xerox case, ruling that it is legal for a 
legitimate holder of a patent to refuse the issue a license regardless of intent or 
effect on competition12 13.  
 
2. The second case relates to mergers and concerns divestitures and licensing as a 
means to preserve competition. Specifically, it addresses the question whether a 
consent order in a merger case could be made conditional on the divestiture of a 
research lab or the mandatory licensing of a key proprietary technology? The 
consent agreement entered into the Ciba-Geigy 14 merger suggests that it can. The 
consent order stated that steps should be taken to maintain rivalry not only in the 
product market but also in the technology market and the innovation market  15. 
The order provided for the licensing of a key proprietary technology as a 
condition of the merger. This was, based on the claim that without such licensing, 
competition in the technology market would be harmed. The essential facility 
doctrine was brought into play. It was argued that the specific gene therapy 
technology to which the parties held property rights was an essential input to next-
generation developments. Under this doctrine, compulsory licensing could be used 
as a remedy under antitrust law.  
 
3. Another case involves Intel, a firm that accounts for almost 80 % of the world’s 
supply of microprocessors. Because Intel and others control key patents on CPU 
technology , barriers to entry in the industry are high. They are heightened further 
by important network and feedback effects due to the combination of Intel chips 
with the Windows Microsoft’s operating system (Wintel). In order to smoothen 
the incorporation of Intel’s upcoming technologies into the complementary goods, 
Intel has implemented the practice of giving its main customers advance 
information about new and upcoming processor prototypes.  
 
Intergraph, a producer of graphics workstations initiated the first case against Intel 
by suing the company and others for infringement on its CPU patents. Intel 
countered by removing Intergraph from the list of companies benefiting from 
                                                 
12 CSU v Xerox Corp ., In re Independent 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000)  
13 In reaction to this decision, Chairman Pitofsky of the Federal Trade Commission (Pitofsky, 2001) 
make public his concern that the Court’s position gives a disproportionate weight to the regime of 
intellectual property protection in regard to the regime of antitrust.  
14 FTC File 961-0055 (Dec. 1996)  
15 A technology market is one where intellectual property rights are transacted or licensed. An 
innovation market  for a technology consists of the R&D directed to new or improved goods or 
processes and the close substitutes (Gilbert and Sunshine 1995). 
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advance notification of technical details about its forthcoming CPU’s. What's 
more, the defendant threatened to discontinue the sale of microprocessors to the 
plaintiff if the latter carried on with its refusal to sell to it the patents it held on 
CPU technology. Intergraph won a preliminary injunction based on the argument 
that Intel’s microprocessors and associated trade secrets were essential facilities 
under the antitrust laws. The court ordered Intel to deal with Intergraph under 
standard terms16. The apparent implication was that the essential facility doctrine, 
developed mainly to regulate access to essential physical equipment, applies to 
intangible assets.  
 
However Intel appealed and won. The Federal Circuit Court held that Intel’s 
refusal contravened neither antitrust nor patent laws. The Court held that two 
conditions required to make Intel’s conduct unlawful were not met. First, Intel’s 
microchips were not an essential input because other suppliers (AMD, Motorola, 
Sun, and IBM) were able to sell close substitutes. Second, the goal pursued by 
Intel’s in refusing to sell was not to create a monopoly in the downstream market 
because the firm had no intention of entering into downstream activities.  
 
Shortly before that decision was rendered the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
had filed a complaint against Intel in which it argued that the relevant market in 
which Intel behaved abusively was the innovation market. The FTC  claimed that 
the probable effect of Intel’s conduct was to weaken incentives of Intergraph and 
other manufacturers of CPU technology to innovate. This case was settled by a 
consent agreement17 under which Intel committed not to deny advance notification 
of technical information to any customer for the sole reason that such customer 
disputed Intel’s ownership of IPR.  
 
The different approaches taken by the FTC and the higher courts provide further 
illustration of the tension between antitrust and IP laws. The charge brought by the 
FTC and the settlement suggest a possible third test. A refusal to supply information 
or to sell patented products can be unlawful if it harms potential competition in an 
innovation market18. It is not sure whether this test is accepted by the Court of 
Appeals. 
 
In summary one could say that US jurisprudence suggests the relevance of three 
criteria in regard to a refusal to license intellectual property: 1) the intent of the party 
refusing to issue a license, 2) the “essentiality” of the input embodying the know-
how; 3) the impact on incentives to innovate. At this stage though, clarity is still 
missing. This appears to be true in the EU as well (see Landolt and Ysewyn, 2001).  
 
                                                 
16 See Baker (1999). 
17 See FTC Dockett 9288: Agreement containing consent order, in the matter of Intel Corporation 
(http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/d09288intelagreement.htm)  
18 Shapiro (2001) disagrees with this analysis, claiming that the FTC’s approach brushed aside 
concerns about the hold-up to which Intel was subject. “Intel’s true rivals in microprocessor design and 
manufacturing where either not subject to the conduct at issue since they where not Intel customers or 
had cross-licenses with Intel under which the litigation triggering these episodes would simply not 
occur in the first place”. Shapiro claims that the initial sue of Intergraph against Intel was mostly a 
manifestation of an opportunistic behavior of a customer, motivated by putting some burden on the 
microprocessor’s leader in order to obtain some ex-post royalties. 
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4. IP protection and cumulative innovation 
 
The traditional view that stronger protection promotes innovation has recently come 
under attack both by the business community19 and by economists in academia 
(Scotchmer, 1999, Shapiro, 2001). They have offered an alternative view grounded in 
the perception that technological change is not as an isolated event a cumulative 
process where each  innovation, is built on knowledge previously acquired and 
possibly patented by forerunners. This view holds that a current innovation benefits 
not only current inventors and consumers but also offers benefits to the future 
innovators who will build on the current innovation. Moreover, innovations are often 
complementary, in the sense that the overall probability that a particular goal is 
achieved within a given time increases with the number of research lines adopted by 
the different potential innovators. Cumulative and complementary  innovation 
processes are readily apparent in industries as diverse as biotechnology, computer 
software, semiconductors, microprocessors, digital videodisks, video games and the 
Internet.  
 
Under this perspective, the relevant question in regard to incentives must be amended 
to read: What incentives will stimulate the proper amount of pioneering research and, 
at the same time, promote the right amount of effort to build around and/or from the 
initial innovation?  
 
i/  The hold-up problem 
 
Scotchmer (1999) points out that “since an innovator may be both buyer and a seller 
of licenses, it is not obvious whether strengthening IP provides him with more gains 
in one capacity than losses in the other”. Shapiro, (2001) argues that in a process of 
cumulative and complementary innovations, IP protection may produce a “patent 
thicket” i.e. an overlapping set of patents to which a manufacturer must obtain rights 
when introducing a new product. This burden exposes subsequent innovators to the 
danger of being held-up by multiple infringement suits. Shapiro claims that the “hold-
up problem is not a mere theoretical possibility and that both patent and antitrust 
policy makers should regard it as a problem of first order significance in the years 
ahead”.  
 
Hall and Ham (2001) investigate the hold-up potential in the semiconductors industry. 
This very innovative industry displays a striking paradox. It shows an increasing 
propensity to patent. At the same time, firms rely on secrecy, lead time, superior 
manufacturing and design capabilities rather than on patents as protective devices. 
Hall and Ham explain this “patent paradox” by arguing that the portfolios of patents 
amassed by firms are best viewed as “bargaining chips” that serve to lend credibility 
to threats that others will effectively be sued for infringement. They add, however, 
                                                 
19 There are some indices that show that the business community seems now to be in favour of a 
reduction of the patent rights. This can be illustrated by the position expressed by Jeff Bezos, the CEO 
of Amazon.com in an open letter: “I  now believe it’s possible that the current rules governing business 
method and software patents could end up harming all of us”. In the same letter, he proposed to reduce 
the business method and software patent’s length to 3 or 5 years, instead of the current 17 years.  
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that the portfolios also serve to reduce the risk of being held up by other patent 
holders and to enhance ones capacity to negotiate better terms for access to 
technology developed elsewhere. 20 
 
This raises two questions: 1) Does the hold-up problem fall within the ambit of 
competition policy; 2) If so, what tools does competition policy have to deal with it?  
One way out of the hold-up problem is suggested by Green and Scotchmer (1995) and 
Scotchmer (1999). Because the hold-up problem arises from innovators’ weak 
bargaining power when suits are brought after R&D costs have been sunk, they 
suggest that parties engage in ex-ante agreement on the division of profits, i.e. 
agreements between a first generation innovator and a potential applicant for a 
derived improved product. The ex-ante agreement ensures that the second-generation 
innovation is produced whenever it adds to joint profit.21 It also makes certain that the 
first innovator does not capture for himself the overall incremental joint profit 
resulting from an agreement with a second-generation innovator. In doing so the ex-
ante agreement between a holder of an initial right and a subsequent user, reconciles 
the incentives of first and second generation innovators.  
 
Unfortunately, such co-operation faces obstacles. It involves co-ordination costs. One 
of them is that the pioneering inventor may not know with whom he should co-
ordinate. It also may raise antitrust concerns, because it creates the danger of 
eliminating or slowing the race for the next generation technology.  
 
ii/  Cooperative arrangements between IPR holders 
 
Under what circumstances, ex-ante agreements such as cross licenses, patent pools 
and, joint standard settings alleviate the hold-up problem? 
 
A cross-license is an agreement among two or more firms where each of them is 
granted the right to use technologies patented by the other parties. The agreement 
applies either to patents already issued (ex-post agreement) or to prospective future 
patents (ex-ante agreement). A patent pool is an arrangement under which a group of 
patent holders exploits and licenses, as a bundle, all the patents the members hold. 
Joint standard setting involves an agreement whereby a group of firms adopts the 
same technological standard. It ensures compatibility between their components and 
requires that members agree to license all patents essential to the standard. A joint 
standard may be implemented by a standard-setting organization or by the members 
of the industry. A joint standard is different from a de facto standard, which emerges 
when a single firm imposes its product or technology to the entire industry. All these 
arrangements may, but need not, raise antitrust concerns. 
 
 
                                                 
20 The hold-up risk explains why the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property 
Rights (1995) introduced quite severe rules against non-objectively based infringement allegations. 
21 The ex ante agreement in Green and Scotchmer (1995) is based on the Nash bargaining solution, the 
status-quo point being the net profit of each player before the investment for the second generation 
innovation is incurred. The retained framework is for quality improvement by successive innovations. 
The extent of patent protection is measured by the improvement gap below which an innovation 
infringes the previous one  
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 1 Patent pools  
 
A patent pooling agreement is justified from a welfare point of view when the 
knowledge embodied in different patents pertains to complementary inputs into a 
specific technology. If so, pooling allows the internalization of the externality that 
results from complementary inputs. For the participating patent holders, it may be 
more profitable to set the price of the bundle lower than the sum of prices at which 
each patent would be offered by independent operators. This is merely an application 
to intellectual property of Cournot’s well-known result that independent pricing of 
complementary inputs yields higher input prices and lower profits that under 
interdependent pricing. As such, a pooling of complementary patents should not raise 
serious antitrust concerns. Not only does it contribute to solve the hold-up problem, it 
also solves the externality problem. 
 
However, a pooling of rival patents that combine competitive technologies may serve 
to reduce incentives to compete, in R&D, in technology or in downstream product 
markets. Therefore it remains a matter of concern for antitrust. 
 
 2 Cross-licensing 
 
The hold-up problem can also be solved by a cross licensing agreement between 
horizontal competitors when each participating firm holds patents to technology that 
the other firms need. Cross licenses are often found in the microprocessor industry 
where they are used by firms that want to avoid blocking positions among themselves. 
 
Such agreements do not affect price competition in the product market when licensing 
fees do not depend on output (Katz and Shapiro, 1995). Some antitrust concerns may 
nevertheless arise, e.g. when cross licensing agreements include various field-of-use 
or geographic restrictions. Moreover, a grant of licenses to future patents may lower 
incentives to innovate because each party gains easier access to the technology owned 
by the other party. 
 
The US Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property recognize that 
cross-licensing and pooling arrangements may provide “pro-competitive benefits by 
integrating complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking 
positions, and avoiding costly infringement costs”. However, the Guidelines make it 
abundantly clear that these arrangements can be challenged under the rule of reason 
although they are they are presumed to be pro-competitive. They make a clear 
distinction between patents that are complementary or essential for the specific 
technology and patents that are substitute or rival for the same technology.  
 
They also establish that a proposed patent pool must be notified to the authorities. The 
notifying party must produce a publicized search under the supervision of an 
independent patent expert, familiar with the technology, who defines what the 
essential patents are for the corresponding technology. Second, the antitrust authority 
examines diverse aspects such as: the relationship of the IPR being combined; the 
nature of the markets in which those IP rights compete; the extent to which the pool 
controls access to these rights; and the extent to which the pool controls the terms on 
which future innovations will reach the market (Klein, 1997).  
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In regard to the question whether the pooling agreement should be open to all firms 
who would like to join it, the Guidelines take the view that exclusion is unlikely to 
have anti-competitive effects, unless the following conditions hold:“(1) excluded 
firms cannot effectively compete in the relevant market for the good incorporating the 
licensed technologies and, (2) the pool participants collectively possess market power 
in the relevant market”.  
 
When these conditions are met, patent pools will be approved because they appear as 
being both pro-competitive and promoting innovation. This was the case for MPEG-2, 
a patent pool in the video compressing technology22. Patent pools will not be 
approved when they raise the concern that competition in the technology market or in 
the innovation market is lowered. 
 
 3 Joint standard setting 
 
The antitrust concerns raised by joint standard setting are more complex although 
their effects are mostly pro-competitive, particularly in the presence of network 
effects. The Guidelines recognize that technological standards lower transaction costs 
and facilitate the acceptance of new products by consumers. Moreover, because 
technological compatibility increases the benefits of network externalities, the 
standard increases the demand for goods that are complementary to the standardized 
technology. Furthermore, a joint standard forestalls the emergence of a de facto 
standard.  
 
A case in point is the agreement that led to implementation of the standard digital 
videodisk design23. It was drawn up by computer producers, consumer electronics 
manufacturers and movie studios. In that case the FTC concluded that the standard 
enhanced welfare in two ways. By increasing the probability of consumer acceptance, 
it lowered the commercial risk involved in setting up production facilities of 
videodisks. And, in so doing, it was likely to induce more entry into the industry. 
Second, the commercia l development of videodisks was likely to expand the demand 
for complementary products such as high-resolution displays. Therefore, the FTC 
concluded that the standard favoured both the cumulative process of innovation and 
the competitive process in the product markets.  
 
However, it is important to keep in mind that joint standard setting may also have 
anti-competitive effects. First, there is a risk that one team member will convert an 
initially open standard into a de facto proprietary standard that he dominates24. 
                                                 
22 An example of approved patent pool is related to the Video Technology Standard used in Electronics 
and Broadcast Industries, known as MPEG-2 video compressing technology. Nine owners of essential 
patents in this technology decided to pool their patents. They are:  Columbia University, Fujitsu, 
General Instrument, Lucent Technologies, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Philips, Scientific Atlanta, and 
Sony. The single license under the one-stop-shopping of a unique agent (MPEG LA) is available to 
those who provide products or services that store or transmit video information including televisions, 
digital video disks and players, telecommunications equipment as well as cable, satellite and broadcast 
television services.  
(See http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1997/1173.htm) 
23 See Gates, S. (1998), “Standards, innovation and antitrust: Integrating innovation concerns in the 
analysis of collaborative standard setting”, http://www.law.emory.edu/ELJ/volumes/spg98/gates.html 
24 For instance, the same consortium who participated to the standard digital videodisk tried also to 
agree for the digital versatile disk which corresponds to the next generation digital information device. 
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Second, the standard may be used for collusive purposes. Third, there is a risk that by 
maintaining the industry locked- in, the standard will slow down the race for the next 
technology. Notwithstanding these concerns it seems that US antitrust procedures 
focus more on the productive and allocative efficiency aspects rather than on the 
possibly damaging dynamic effects on innovation which are much more difficult to 
evaluate.  
 
 
Conclusion: A role for competition policy in the 
design of intellectual property rights? 
 
One focus in this paper has been on the question whether competition policy can 
restrict uses of intellectual property rights that harm the competitive process. 
However, by restraining the role of competition policy in such way, we ignore another 
possible role that competition policy can play in shaping the pace of innovation.  
 
Competition policy could provide refine incentives for research and innovation by 
fine tuning IP laws, particularly, where there is evidence that protection is overly 
broad and stifles competition (Gallini and Trebilcock, 1998). Such view also seems 
shared by Pitovsky (2001). Fisher and Rubinfeld (2000) opine that “the fact that 
innovation can bring consumer benefits should not provide a license for innovative 
firms to engage in anti-competitive acts”. 
 
Buigues et al.,(1995) hold that exploiting in the best way the complementarity 
between antitrust and IP makes it possible to correct each other’s deficiencies, 
facilitate their enforcement and increase institutional credibility. 
 
We agree with these statements. What we have tried to show in this paper is how the 
assessment of what constitutes an anti-competitive act is a difficult task in innovative 
industries. This is why meeting a coordination between competition policy and 
intellectual protection raises thorny problems. Nevertheless, public authorities should 
be very concerned by this coordination because coherence between microeconomic 
policies is a very important matter. We have illustrated some problems which arise 
when either regime, intellectual protection and antitrust, is accorded disproportionate 
weight.  
 
A theoretical framework that can be of some help in investigating the question of how 
to enforce complementarity between antitrust and IP can be found in the literature that 
investigates the institutional design of regulatory mechanisms. One of the questions 
addressed by this literature deals with the justification of the separation between 
regulatory agencies. Those who argue for the separation of regulators. do so for two 
reasons. First, because a separation acts as a commitment against the threat of 
regulatory captures (Laffont and Martimort, 1998). Second, because the presumption 
that some private welfare improving action (e.g. a decision by a firm to file a patent) 
could be deterred if it involves the risk of triggering antitrust action under a common 
regulatory framework (Bensaid et al., 1995). One could add that separation between 
                                                                                                                                            
Some members have agreed to an encryption standard that will help protect copyrighted works, but the 
fear that one or a small  number of firms would dominate such standard did not allow an agreement. 
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antitrust and IP regulators also has merit because it maintains the comparative 
advantages of the two legal institutions.  
 
One claim is that complementarity between intellectual protection and competition 
policy could be improved if antitrust authorities provided input into the legislative 
process. Competition policy could affect both the ex-ante incentives to innovate, by 
ensuring that innovation receives a justified return on her R&D investments and, the 
nature of post innovation competition in the product market. In turn, IP authorities 
would allocate rights by designing rules that favour incentives to innovate without 
conflicting with antitrust principles. This interaction would have the advantage of 
reminding each authority that neither antitrust nor intellectual property protection are 
ends by themselves, but only complementary instruments for allocating resources 
which both promote dynamic efficiency especially in innovative industries 
(d’Aspremont et al. 2000). For instance, competition policy and intellectual protection 
should both try to clarify the conditions where inappropriate protection (either 
excessive or insufficient) may be detrimental both for competition and for innovation.  
 
One way to converge towards coordination could be by encouraging antitrust and IP 
authorities to issue common guidelines accepted by both sides. This would generalize 
the current attempts by antitrust agencies to define the “safety zones”, i.e. the type of 
collaborative arrangements which are immune to antitrust scrutiny.  
 
Some rules have been suggested. One of them is that the instruments of patent 
protection (length, scope, etc.) need not be uniform across industries. A case in point 
concerns the industries where network effects are important, for instance the software 
industry. Starting from the argument that strong intellectual property rights and 
network externalities reinforce each other by favouring market dominance by a single 
firm, Church and Ware (1998) argue in favor of weaker protection in these industries. 
For instance, excessive intellectual property protection creates a burden in software 
markets since it is more and more difficult to build around previous patented software. 
Patenting does not seem to be the best form of protection, nor the best incentive to 
innovate in these markets. In a dynamic world, software imitation can provide 
benefits to the innovator and to society as a whole (Bessen and Maskin, 2000). For 
these reasons, a current proposal calls for the creation of sui generis protection in 
software that would combine copyright and compulsory licensing after a relatively 
short period. A discussion on the merits and drawbacks of such proposal is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
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